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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Plaintiff Janice Freed appeals from the order dismissing 
her claim against the Consolidated Rail Corporation 
("Conrail") under the Rehabilitation Act for failure to 
exhaust her administrative remedies. Her appeal requires 
that we decide whether a plaintiff must exhaust 
administrative remedies prior to bringing suit under section 





Freed's complaint sets out the following facts, which in 
the context of a motion to dismiss we must accept as true, 
although we have some question about the chronology of 
events. Freed began working for Conrail in 1978 in a 
clerical capacity. She suffered from herniated discs, which 
limited her ability to perform tasks that required bending, 
lifting, and climbing. She alleges that in April of 1992 she 
was "bumped" from her position at Conrail. 
 
In late 1992 or early 1993, Freed's condition began to 
stabilize to the point where she could return to work full 
time albeit with limitations on standing, bending, and 
lifting. Conrail recalled her to work in early 1993 but she 
"was specifically told that if she had any restrictions she 
 




would not be permitted to return to work." App. at 8. 
Apparently because she did have restrictions, Freed has 
since been carried by Conrail as "disabled - prolonged 
sickness." App. at 8. According to Freed, she could have 
performed the job for which she was recalled with only 
minimal accommodation. Conrail has never performed a 
functional assessment of Freed's ability to perform her 
former job or any other job, although she alleges she was 
eligible for numerous vacant positions. 
 
Before commencing this litigation, Freed was a member 
of a class action certified in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania. The class was certified to pursue claims for 
injunctive relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
42 U.S.C. S 12101 et seq. (ADA), and section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. S 794 (the "Act"), and included 
current and former Conrail employees and applicants who 
"ha[d] been denied employment . . . because of their 
disabilities." App. at 22. The case was tried before the court 
which found for Conrail on the merits, a decision affirmed 
on appeal. See Mandichak v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 178 
F.3d 1279 (3d Cir. 1999) (table). The District Court vacated 
its class certification order and entered judgment for 
Conrail on August 20, 1998 "without prejudice to the right 
of any plaintiff, or any other employee, to assert individual 
claims against Conrail under the ADA [or] the 
Rehabilitation Act." App. at 45. 
 
Freed then brought this individual suit against Conrail 
alleging the company had violated Title I of the ADA and 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Conrail filed a motion 
to dismiss asserting that both claims were barred by 
Freed's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies, as 
she had not filed an administrative charge with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission or with the 
appropriate state agency before, during, or after the 
maintenance of the class action. The Magistrate Judge 
issued a report recommending dismissal for failure to 
exhaust, and the District Court entered an order adopting 
that report. This appeal followed. 
 
Shortly before the oral argument, Freed filed a motion 
under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b) for 
 




voluntary dismissal of her ADA claim on appeal. 1 We 
advised the parties at oral argument that we would grant 
that motion, subject to our later decision on costs. We have 
now entered an order granting the Rule 42(b) motion. It 
follows that the sole issue remaining for disposition on 
appeal is whether Freed was required to exhaust 
administrative remedies prior to bringing suit under section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act.2 
 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Our 
review of the District Court's order dismissing Freed's claim 
under Rule 12(b)(6) is plenary. See Moore v. Tartler, 986 




We begin by briefly discussing the pertinent sections of 
the Rehabilitation Act. 
 
Section 501 of the Act is directed specifically at 
employment discrimination and requires each federal 
department, agency, and instrumentality, including the 
Postal Service ("federal employer"), to adopt an affirmative 
action program plan for the hiring, placement and 
advancement of persons with disabilities. 29 U.S.C. 
S 791(b). Originally, Congress provided no private right of 
action for persons aggrieved by a violation of section 501, 
but in 1978 Congress added such a right. This was effected 
by providing in section 505(a)(1) that "[t]he remedies, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. When it first learned through the reply brief of Freed's suggestion 
that 
she would seek to withdraw her appeal of the judgment on the ADA 
claim, Conrail objected. It argued that Freed had not filed a Rule 42(b) 
motion, which she later did. It also argued that withdrawal of the ADA 
claim should not be permitted because the same issue was pending in 
other cases against it. We do not deem that a sufficient ground for 
requiring the parties to litigate the issue in this case if plaintiff is 
satisfied to proceed only on her claim under section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act. 
 
2. We wish to comment on the civility shown by counsel for both parties 
during the oral argument to the court and to each other. It is, of course, 
consistent with the standard of conduct we expect and have often 
observed; we make note of it here to encourage all attorneys to do the 
same. 
 




procedures, and rights . . . [of Title VII] of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 . . . shall be available, with respect to any 
complaint" under section 501. 29 U.S.C. S 794a(a)(1). Title 
VII requires plaintiffs to exhaust the administrative process 
prior to bringing suit. See Trevino-Barton v. Pittsburgh Nat'l. 
Bank, 919 F.2d 874, 878 (3d Cir. 1990). Thus, persons can 
sue a federal employer for injunctive relief and/or damages 
for violating section 501 but are required to exhaust 
administrative remedies. 
 
Section 504 has a broader reach. It bars both federal 
agencies and private entities that receive federal funding 
from discriminating on the basis of disability and is not 
limited to the employment context. It provides: 
 
       No otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . 
       shall, solely by reason of his or her disability, be 
       excluded from the participation in, be denied the 
       benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
       program or activity receiving Federal financial 
       assistance or under any program or activity conducted 
       by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal 
       Service. 
 
29 U.S.C. S 794(a). 
 
This section originally applied only to programs receiving 
federal funding, but the 1978 amendments to the Act made 
section 504 applicable to federal agencies and the Postal 
Service. However, in contrast to the incorporation of Title 
VII rights and remedies into section 501, the 1978 
amendments provided in section 505(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. 
S 794a(a)(2), that "the remedies, procedures, and rights set 
forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964" were 
applicable to persons aggrieved by a violation of section 
504. Title VI includes an administrative procedure that can 
lead to the withdrawal of federal funding from programs or 
activities that discriminate on the basis of race, color, or 
national origin, but it does not require that plaintiffs 
exhaust the administrative process before bringing suit. See 
Jeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon School Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 281 
(3d Cir. 1996); Chowdhury v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 
677 F.2d 317, 321-22 (3d Cir. 1982). We have explained 
that this reflects a recognition that the Title VI 
 




administrative process "cannot provide the relief[plaintiffs] 
seek." Id. at 323 n.16. 
 
In Spence v. Straw, 54 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 1995), we were 
faced with a suit under section 504 filed by a federal 
employee against his federal employer. We noted that if the 
plaintiff had brought suit under section 501, he would have 
been required to exhaust his administrative remedies. We 
shared the concern expressed in McGuinness v. United 
States Postal Serv., 744 F.2d 1318, 1322 (7th Cir. 1984), 
that this would permit a federal employee to circumvent the 
section 501 exhaustion requirement by the simple 
expedient of suing under section 504. The McGuinness 
court had believed it improbable that Congress,"having 
specifically addressed employment of the handicapped by 
federal agencies . . . in section 501, would have done so 
again a few sections later in section 504." Id. at 1321. We 
too believed it was unlikely that Congress wanted to provide 
"different sets of remedies, having different exhaustion 
requirements, for the same wrong committed by the same 
employer." Spence, 54 F.3d at 201 (quoting McGuinness, 
744 F.2d at 1321). Therefore, we held, as had the court in 
McGuinness, that federal employees must exhaust Title VII 
administrative remedies before filing suit against a federal 
employer under section 504. 
 
The situation in Spence was far different than that 
presented here. Conrail is not a federal employer, but 
rather is the recipient of federal funding, and thus it can be 
sued for a violation of section 504 but not for a violation of 
section 501. Therefore, our concerns in Spence are not 
implicated here. 
 
Instead, Freed's case more closely resembles that of the 
plaintiff in Jeremy H., 95 F.3d 272, decided a year after 
Spence. Jeremy H., a visually handicapped minor, sued his 
school district, school board, and various individual 
defendants under a number of statutes, including section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The District Court dismissed 
the complaint for failure to exhaust. In discussing whether 
Jeremy H. needed to exhaust his administrative remedies to 
maintain the section 504 claim, we noted that section 504 
"is not ordinarily subject to an exhaustion requirement." Id. 
at 282 n.17. We distinguished Spence as "involving very 
 




unusual circumstances" that required us to construe the 
apparently incongruous enforcement scheme created by 
sections 501 and 504 as applied to employment 
discrimination suits against federal agencies. Id. at 281. 
Because Jeremy H., unlike Spence, was not suing a federal 
agency for employment discrimination, and his claims did 
not "have the effect of circumventing some other 
Congressionally mandated exhaustion requirement," id. at 
282, we held that he was not required to exhaust his 
administrative remedies before suing on his section 504 
claims. 
 
Conrail acknowledges that employees of private recipients 
of federal funding, unlike their counterparts working for a 
federal employer, are typically not required to exhaust 
administrative remedies before filing suit under section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act. Nonetheless, Conrail argues that 
the District Court did not err in dismissing Freed's 
complaint for failure to exhaust in light of our decisions in 
Spence and Jeremy H. Those decisions do not counsel 
dismissal here. Freed, unlike the plaintiffs in Spence and 
McGuinness, does not have the option of suing under 
section 501. Because Freed has withdrawn her ADA claim, 
we are presented with the narrow issue whether a plaintiff 
suing solely under section 504 must exhaust the Title VI 
administrative process before bringing suit against a private 
recipient of federal funds. We know of no precedent, in this 
court or elsewhere, that imposes such a requirement. 
 
Every court of appeals to have addressed this question 
has already held that plaintiffs suing private recipients of 
federal funds under section 504 do not need to exhaust 
Title VI administrative remedies. See, e.g., Brennan v. King, 
139 F.3d 258, 268 n.12 (1st Cir. 1998); Tuck v. HCA Health 
Serv. of Tennessee, Inc., 7 F.3d 465, 470-71 (6th Cir. 1993); 
Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330, 1338 (9th Cir. 1990); 
Miener v. State of Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 978 (8th Cir. 
1982); Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 
1372, 1382 (10th Cir. 1981); Lloyd v. Regional Transp. 
Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1287 (7th Cir. 1977). These holdings 
reflect the fact that "the applicable remedies[under Title VI] 
provide no individual relief, including no damage orders 
against an employer." Tuck, 7 F.3d at 471. The Title VI 
 




administrative remedy, which provides for the termination 
of federal financial assistance to programs that violate Title 
VI, 42 U.S.C. S 2000d-1, does not "include or encompass 
equitable relief for the affected individual." Pushkin, 658 
F.2d at 1381. 
 
Our earlier holding in NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 599 
F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979), although arising in a different 
context, is consistent with this line of cases. In Medical 
Center, individual and organizational plaintiffs sued the 
Wilmington Medical Center, a hospital that received 
substantial federal support, alleging that the hospital had 
chosen a relocation site in a discriminatory manner. The 
plaintiffs also sued various participants in the review 
process established by the Social Security Act to screen 
capital expenditure programs. We rejected defendants' 
arguments that Title VI and section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act did not create private rights of action 
and, in making that determination, we held that"there 
exists a private cause of action under section 601 of Title VI 
which may be asserted without preliminary recourse to 
agency remedial procedures." Id. at 1250 n.10. We based 
this holding on the fact that "private parties are normally 
precluded from advancing their [Title VI] rights before the 
administrative agency." Id. at 1254. 
 
Because "the regulations that enforce section 504[of the 
Rehabilitation Act] are the same procedures adopted to 
enforce Title IX," Tuck, 7 F.3d at 471, most of the cases 
holding that there need be no exhaustion for section 504 
claims have relied on the Supreme Court's decision in 
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
There, the Court held that Title IX (which is enforced by the 
same procedures that enforce section 504) created a private 
right of action that plaintiffs could pursue without 
exhausting administrative remedies. See id. at 706-08 n.41. 
 
Conrail argues that the Supreme Court's more recent 
decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 
U.S. 60 (1992), which held that monetary damages were 
available to plaintiffs in Title IX actions, severely eroded the 
rationale for the decisions of the courts of appeals that held 
that non-federal employees suing under section 504 are not 
required to exhaust administrative remedies. Conrail views 
 




the earlier cases as dependent on the absence of 
administrative remedies providing any individual relief, 
including damages. Conrail interprets Franklin to imply "the 
existence of both a private right of action and monetary 
damages for violations of section 504" of the Rehabilitation 
Act. Appellee's brief at 12. Indeed, we relied on Franklin in 
our holding that monetary damages are available in section 
504 actions. See W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 494 (3d Cir. 
1995). But we do not agree that this calls into question the 
validity of the earlier holdings that exhaustion was not 
required by section 504 plaintiffs. 
 
In the first place, we have explained that section 504 
(and Title VI) plaintiffs need not undertake administrative 
exhaustion because that process fails to provide them with 
meaningful relief. See Chowdhury, 677 F.2d at 322; see 
also Jeremy H., 95 F.3d at 282 n.17 (decided after Matula 
and reiterating that section 504 "is not ordinarily subject to 
an exhaustion requirement"). For example, although the 
Department of Transportation regulations that implement 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, see 49 C.F.R. pt. 27, 
permit an aggrieved person to file a "written complaint with 
the responsible Departmental official," 49 C.F.R. 
S 27.123(b), they do not provide for individual relief. The 
Department may attempt informal dispute resolution with 
the recipient of federal funds, see 49 C.F.R. S 27.123(d), 
and, if these efforts are unsuccessful, may determine, after 
a hearing, whether to suspend or terminate funding, see 49 
C.F.R. S 27.125. Although the complainant is notified of the 
time and place of the hearing, see 49 C.F.R. S 27.127(a)(2), 
the regulations make no provision for the complainant to 
participate in the hearing or to recover damages, see 49 
C.F.R. S 27.127; see also Miener, 673 F.2d at 978 (finding 
Department of Health and Human Services administrative 
process inadequate because section 504 plaintiff may not 
furnish evidence or participate in investigation, appeal an 
adverse decision, or recover damages). Even though 
plaintiffs may recover damages in a court proceeding, the 
applicable administrative process under Title VI does not 
provide them with meaningful relief. 
 
In the second place, nothing in the language of section 
504 or Title VI requires administrative exhaustion. Conrail 
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 argues that even where a private plaintiff has not included 
a claim under Title I of the ADA (which requires exhaustion 
of Title VII rather than Title VI remedies), 42 U.S.C. 
S 12117(a), with his or her claim under section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act, the fact that a plaintiff has the option of 
doing so gives plaintiffs the ability to circumvent the ADA 
exhaustion process by limiting their claim to one under 
section 504. However, we are dealing with an issue of 
Congress's intent. In Spence, we were construing two 
potentially conflicting sections of the Rehabilitation Act and 
held Congress intended to require exhaustion. We have no 
basis to assume that Congress had a similar intent with 
respect to two independent statutes. 
 
Conrail argues that Congress has already expressed a 
desire to coordinate the ADA with the Rehabilitation Act 
and it points to various provisions of these two statutes. 
The aim of these provisions is to achieve substantive 
conformity and to avoid duplication of effort. See 42 U.S.C. 
S 12117(b); see also 29 U.S.C. S 791(g) (standards to 
determine whether S 501 of the Rehabilitation Act has been 
violated are the same as those applied under ADA sections); 
29 U.S.C. S 794(d) (same). Nothing in these provisions 
addresses an exhaustion requirement. Where Congress has 
wanted to coordinate statutes in that way it has done so 
expressly. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C.S 1415(f) (requiring plaintiffs 
suing under other federal statutes, including the 
Rehabilitation Act, to exhaust administrative remedies 
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act "to 
the same extent as would be required had the action been 
brought under this subchapter"). 
 
Accordingly, we reaffirm our long-standing position that 
section 504 plaintiffs may proceed directly to court without 




For the reasons set forth, we will reverse the decision of 
the District Court dismissing Freed's claim under section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act and remand to that court for 
further proceedings. Because Freed's failure to dismiss her 
appeal of the dismissal of the ADA claim earlier put Conrail 
 




to the effort and expense of briefing that issue, we will 
require that each party bear its own costs. 
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